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Hawaii Medical Professionals
Assessment
A study of the availability of doctors and nurses to staff non-hospital, field
medical facilities for mass casualty incidents resulting from the use of
weapons of mass destruction and the level of knowledge and skills of
these medical professionals as related to the treatment of victims of
such incidents.
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Study objective
The purpose 01 this ttidv ‘sas to determine the capacits otHonoulu
to i’ov ide entergencv ii tedical care to sicti ins of incident caused
a Weapons ol Mass Destruction WMD or natural disaster and
to determine the level of expertise of the healthcare professionals in
the comniunit’.
Introduction
Honolulu began planning a response to a TThiss casualt incident due
to a man made or natural disaster in 1997 as part of the Metropolitan
Medical Response System NI NI RS promoted and supported by the
Deparniient of Health and Human Services DHHS. The NIMRS
cities were asked by DHHS to he able to provide medical care for
victims of a biological incident up to I () percent and fatalities up to
2.5 percent of theirpopulation. or in Honolulu’s case. approximately
11)0.0(10 patients and 25.0(10 latalities. With a total of 1 .350 beds in
1 2 hospital facilities in Honolulu. and s oh fewer than 2Sf) beds
available to new patients on a given day. the Honolulu MMRS
Planning and Development (MMRS P&Di Committee realized the
need to establish alternative medical facilities. such a’ non—hospital.
field medical facilities to provide the medical care, as hospital
resources would be quickla os erwhelmed. I losve\ er. s hile explor
ing possible response systems the Committee also realized that even
il it could establish and suppl\ alternative medical care facilities to
treat victnns ol a weapon ot mass destruction incident. Honolulu
misht hase ditticult\ in staffing such tacilities. In addition. the
MMRS P&[) Committee thought that doctors and nurses volunteer
ing in such facilities might not he knowledgeable and skilled in
treating S dims of \keapons ot mass destruction A’iMD
Consequentl\. this study sought to determine both the cmpacit\
Honolulu to staff medical field facilities and the lesel of knoss ledge
and skills, as related to biological and chemical weapons of mass
destruction, of those as ailable to staff such facilities,
Methods
Study
The Hawaii Medical Professionals Assessment, a four page 16—
question assessment tool. ss as mailed to the target audience on July
II. 2001. and a retuni date of Juls St. 2(8)1 ssas set, although
responses were accepted until August 15. 2001 . due to late submis
sion fs those on acation. The target audience md tided phx sicians.
doctors of ostcopath . ads anced practice registered nurse, regis
tered nurses, and licensed practical/s ocational nurses. “Phsicins’’
included all active, licensed practitioners, retired licensed practitio
ners, doctors (if osteopathy, and medical residents (n=2.235) lis ing
in Hass an. ‘‘\Iirses’’ included all ads anced practice recistered
nurses. registered nurses, and licensed vocational/practical nirses
(tt= 12,380) living in Hawaii.
Proced Lire
The MNIRS P&l) Committee assisted the authors in the develop
ment of the assessment tool. This collahoratis e effort included
representatives from the Hawaii State Department of Health, the
Hawaii Healthcare Association, the University of Hawaii School of
Medicine. The Queen’s Medical Center. the I law an urses Asso
ciation. Tripler Arms Medical Center arid the National Disaster
Medical System. the Hawaii State and Oahu Civil Defense Agen
cies. and the Honolulu Emergency Services Department.
The Hasvaii Medical Association, a pris ate group that maintains
a databank based upi m state licensing, regardless of membership.
supplied the names and addresses of physicians. The Hasvati Nurses
Association also maintains a datahank based upon state licensure,
and supplied most names and addresses of nurses.
The Assessment Tool
The assessment tool, the Hass au Medical Professionals Assessment,
svas comprised of sixteen questions dealing svith a variety of issues,
cc.. Lirosvledge arid abilit\ as related to biological agent” and
categories of chemical agents. interest ni trainmnlg and education.
areas of professional cspertisc.hoss best to utilize professional skills
during a mass casualty incident, the effact various conditions might
have on an individual’s willingness to staff emergency field medical
lacilitic” and. ultimately. ss hether the individtial ssonld help staff a
noii-hsNpital. field medical facilities during a mass casualty es emit.
ihis paper focuses on responses to the qtiestions about knowledge
and ability, interest in receiving more education and training, and
comnutmuent to statf rion-hospital. tield medical facilities.
[he list Si\ questions dealt with the issues elating to eeireral
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knowledge of. ahilit to recognize signs and symptoms 01, and
ahilit to treat specilic biolo ical agents and groups of chemical
agents. These included anthra’s, hrucellois, piaeue small go’s.
tularemia, hemonhagic lx er. influenza. E. coli. and sainmuella. for
Questions I to3, and nerve agents, choking agents. blood and
blistering agents for Questions 4 toô. Question 7 asked participants
to indicate x hether thex had an interest in recei\ inc additional
training concerning the agents listed above.
Assessment Tool Distribution
Before the onset of the stud\ three field tests xx crc conducted xx ith
cli fldren t eroups of doctors and n ii rses xx ho xx el-C part of the target
audience. The first field test was conducted at a meeting of the State
Department of Health, Morbidity and Mortality Committee consist
ing of t\x dye emergency care professionals. i.e.. eight emergency
room physicians. txx o “other’’ physicians. one registered nurse.
retired, xx ith active license, and one unmarked proldssioual. The
second field test, using an updated version, was conducted at a
Hawaii \lirses Association meeting. The sur\ er was given to sex en
registered nurses. in the third field test thirteen public health nui’es
completed a rex ised assessment tool and further feedback xx as
received. in each field test, minimal explanation was given prior to
the handing out of the tool. A cover letter was attached to each - The
attempt xx as to approximate the same situation as if the assessment
tool and cover letter had arris ed in the mail. The participants in these
three field tests had no prior knowledge of the project. Comments,
questions. and suggestions from these meetings were evaluated and
changes xvere incorporated into the final version of both the intro
duction letter and the assessment tool -
Analysis
All analyses xx ei’e conducted separately for doctors and nurses. 1 he
response lrequeucies lor each of the 16 questions wem’e calculated.
in addition to these univariate analyses. other maly ses examined
possible interactions betxveen the respondents’ level of knowledge,
ability to recogn I ie and ahi Ii ty to treat the yarn ms agents, and their
xx illingness to i-eceive more training and education, as well as their
willingness to staff non—hospital field medical facilities. Summary
scores were used to characterize respondents’ level of knoxvleclge.
and ahi I it to recogn lie and treat - The 11 ioiog cal su rn mark score
was the arithuieticsuumof responses tocluestmonson the nine biologic
agents. A value of I was assigned to an “Agree” response. 2 for
“Somewhat agree’’, 3 for “Somewhat disagree”, and 4 for “Dis
agree”. iThe mieaimermt of mmssg iesponses m” discussed in the
paracraph beloxx Smliiarl\. a chemical score siimmmar\ xx as the
sum of responses to qLiestions on the four chemical agent groups.
These two sunirnary scores xx crc then divided into eitherqziaitmles or
teitiles xx rh roughir equal numbers of iespoudents after disnn
cu’hing respondents xx ho answered “disay’ree’ to all the selections
concerning either the biological or chemical agents. (This included
II .6% of the biological scores and 51 .6% of the chemical scores of
the conibimmed group of doctors and nurse’. i.e. 3.334. Consc-
cluently. although the nLmnlhers f healthcare professionals in the
individual quartile and tertile categories were not equal, these terms
were used for the sake of convenience, Quartiles were used for the
biological scores, and teltilc’ for the cheinic,ml score’.
The lourth qnarnlc for ph ician biological scoie xx as determined
by the number of physicians (n 99) meporting the least knowledge
and ability as defined by their knowledge of, ability- to recognize
signs and s niptoms of. and ability to ti-eat biological agents. The
fourth quart i I e for ii urse biological score xx as determined b\ the
nLimherof nurses (n = 289 reporting the least knoxvledge and ability
as defined hx their knoxx ledge of. ability to recognize signs and
symptoms ol. and ahilit to treat biological agents. The third tei’mmle
for the physicmmn chemical score xvas determined b\ the number of
phycnms u = 283) reporting the least knowledge and ahilmt as
defined by their knowledge of. ability to recognize signs and
s\ iuptonw of and ability to treat ehenucal agents. The Third Tertile
for nurse chemical score was determumed by the number of nurses in
= 143$ repoi’ting the least knoxx ledge arid ability as defined by their
knoxx:ledge of. ability to recognize signs and symptoms of, and
ahi lit\ to treat chcmimieal agents.
Surx eys fi’om 6tL I I (-c of 55fo of the physicians and 425 l5 of
2775) of the nurses had missing responses to at least one 0f the 39
options for the six questions. in getmeral. approximately one—third
186) of these 485 assessments tools xvere missing responses to omily
one option. xx hile one-hal I 239 xverc missing responses to three or
fexx er options. Rather thami discard the responses of these partici
pants from analyses when computing the biological and chemical
scores, missing responses xx crc gmx en a x aluc equal to a “Disagree”
response.. \lthough it is not possible to x erifv this assumption.
results from analyses in xx hich the missing responses xx crc yalued
the same as an “agree” response were very similar to the resrmlts
pm-esented here. i.e.. assigning a missing i’esponse the value of
“agree or “disagree’’ did not c’hamtge the pai’ticmpants quartile.
Assigning missing responses the same value as a “disagree” re—
spon produces a conservative bias, if any-, in the characterization
of the knowledge and ability of the respondents.’’
Results
Survey Participants: Profession and Specialty
A total of 3.386 (23. I %) surveys xvere retnirned. with and additional
302 non_delivem’ablex. i.e.. 16 doctoi-s and 286 nui’ses. Respondents
included 550 of 2.235. i 25( I phr smcmans and 2,775 of 12.381)
(22.4%) nnmrses Since responses were analyzed according to profes
sional status. i.e.. Doctor or Nurse, responses were not utilized from
the 52 respondents who did not specmt\ profession.
The most common specmaltr among doct rs xx as prmnlarc came.
accounting for 42% of the total, T’hirty—two percent otthe physician
respondents chose the category “Other” for the category specialty:
another 8.2’, of the physicians were added to the ‘‘Other’’ eroup.
which included a sm;mll numyiherofm-etiied ph\ sicians 12i. infectious
dmsx. we iS) pulmon mx (8) md immultiplL spcm ilts phx smemans 1$)
Thus, 41.2(3 ofihe physicians xvene in the “Other” group. Surgeons
comprised 11’
. amid emergenc\ physicians only -L - More than
mxx o-third’ t60.7(3 of the nurses repoi-ted RN credentials, and
more reported they had adx anced practice RN credentials. Most of
the rest were Licensed Practical/Vocational Nurses (13(3 i, or Re
tiied :1 (m
Knowledge and Ability Concerning Biological Agents
In res rise to the statement concerning fin.’mJ dcx of nine biologi
cal acenis. i.e 1 am knoxx lcdgeable about ...:‘t he biological agent
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physicians reported kno ing the most about was Influenza, receiv
ing 52% of the “agree.” or knowledgeable.” responses, The
biological auent ph\ sicians repored knowing the least about was
Tularemia. receiving only .7 of the ‘‘agree’’ or ‘‘knos ledgeable’’
i’esponses and 52% of the “disagree’’ or ‘‘not kno ledgeable,”
responses. Physicians’ responses to the nine agents are presented in
Table I.
In response to the statement cons’ernina the tibiliiv it> re>’ogiii
i/u’ .>i,i,s and .viiipiono of nine biological agents, i.e.. ‘‘I can
recognize the signs and symptoms of.... the biological agent
physicians reported being able to most recognize was Influenza,
receiving 54> of the “agree:’ or “able to recognize” responses. The
biological agent plt\ sicians reported being able to recognire the
least ssas Tularemia, receiving only’ 5>ir of the “agree” or “able to
recognize’ responses, and 56% of the “disagree” or “not able to
recognize,’’ responses. Physicians’ responses to the nine agents ai’e
presented in Table 2.
In response to the statement concerning the ability to treat nine
biological agents, i.e., “I know how to Ireat casualties ot a biological
incident in\ olvine...,’’t he biological agent physicians reported most
able to treat was Intluenza, receiving 42% of the “agree,” or “able
to treat” responses. The biological agents physicians reported least
able to treat were Anthrax and Tulareniia, v> ith Tularemia getting
onl\ 51 and Anthrax vetting 7% of’ the “agree’’ or ‘‘ability to treat”
responses, and both getting 64> of the “disagree” or ‘‘not able to
tm’eat,” responses. Physicians’ responses to the nine agents are
presented in Table 3.
Somewhat Somewhat
Bio Agent Agree DwagreeAgree Disagree
Anthrax 10% (56) 23% (126) 17% (95) 48% (267)
Brucetosis 08%, 47: 20 1101 18% 96; 51% 288;
Plague 11% (63) 19% (105) 19% )108 48% )267i
Small pox i5 83:. 22%, (123 18% 99 43% 1242
Tularemia 08% (42) 17% (95) 20% (1101 52% (293;
Hemorrhagic 20% 19% 1106 47% (265;
tever
Influenza 52% (292) 19% (107) 06% (34) 21% (117)
B. coli 45%, 252 25% 140; 07% >38; 22% (121 i
Salmonella 34% (191) 27% (149) 10% (55) 27% (151i
Nurses and Biological Agents
In response to the statement concerning knowledge of nine biologi
cal agents, i.e.,”I am knowledgeable about...,’’ the biological agent
nurses reported knowing the most about was Int’luenia, recei me
5 I % of the “agree,” or “knowledgeable.” responses.le biological
agent nurses reported knowing the least about was Tulareinia,
receiving onl\ 3% of the “agree” or “knowledgeable” responses and
72% of’ the ‘‘disagree” or “not knowledgeable.” responses. Nurses’
responses to the nine agents ai’e presented in Table 4.
In response to the statement concerning the ability to recogni:e
nine biological agents, ic.. ‘‘I can i’ecognize the signs and s’> mptoms
of exposure to...,” the biological agent nurses reported most able to
recognize > as Influenza, receis ing 4’ of the “agree,” or “able to
recognize signs and symptoms responses. The biological agent
nurses reported least able to recognize was Tularemia, receiving 2%
of the “agree” or ‘‘ able to recognize signs and symptoms ‘‘ ic—
spouses. and 75% of the ‘‘disagi’ee” or ‘‘not able to recognize signs
and symptoms responses. Nurses’ responses to the nine agents are
presented in Table 5.
In response to the ctatement concerning the abthrv to treal nine
biological agents, i.e., “I knos how to treat casualties of a biological
incident involving.... “ the biological agent nurses reported most
able t; ti’eat was Influenza, receiving 31%77 >1’ the “agree,” or “able
to treat responses. The bmoloa’mcal agent nurses i’epoi’ted least able
to treat as Tularemma, ith ouR 2> ( reporting ‘‘agree’ or’’able to
treat” and 7)’)%’ reporting “disagree” or”not able to treat.” Nurses’
responses to the nine agents are presented in Table 6.
.
Somewhat Somewhat
Bmo Agent Agree . DisagreeAgree Disagree
Anthrax 08% i45l 15% (85) 20% (113) 53% (298)
Brucellosis 06% 33 14% (81 21% (1201 55% (305)
Plague 07% >411 18% (98) 20% (1141 52% (288i
Small pox 14% >75) 23% (126; 20% (113; 40% 1225)
Tularemia Q5C >27> 14% (79; 20% (112; 56% (3131
Hemormaac . . ‘.,
e o6 “ 106 1 >lu’.; .8
fever
influenza 54 303 ‘3%, 1.7Th 75%, ‘23 20%
E. coo 43% (241) 25 (141) 08% (45) 21% (11.9)
Swmoneila 3%,. ‘135 2%. 14%, 1%,. 53’ ‘53’
Table 1. — Physicians fed eable about Biological Agents’
‘Percentages of no responses for each of the nine biological agents were
as follows: anthrax, 3% ll5l: brucellosis, 3% (161: plague. 3% (16): small
pox, 2% (12): tularemia, 3% (19): influenza 2% (9): 8. coli, 1% 18);
salmonella, 2% (13): hemorrhagic fever, 3% (19).
Table 2. — Physicians ability to ggpize signs and symptoms of
exposure to Biological Agents*
*Percentages of no responses for each of the woe biological agents acm
as fr’llovs anthrax 3 o 1181 brucellosis 4 (20 plague 30 18) small
ccx 3 17 tu’arema a 126i inf)ueza 2 91 5 r2 2 131
salmonella, 200. ll3i: hemorrhagic fever. 3% 15.
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Somewhat Somewhat8w Agent Agree DisagreeAgree Disagree
Anthrax 07:: 38) 12% 68 15% 82) 64:: (355)
Brucellosis 06% 1311 11% 631 17% (9% 62% (3491
Plague 06°c (35) 13% 75 16% (89) 61% %43)
Small pox 09% 571 10% 58 17: 941 60% 3381
Tularemia 05% (26) 10% (55) 18% (1001 64% (356)
Hemorrhagic 08% 42) 13% 75 17% (97) . 325fever
Influenza 42:: 232) 20:: (111) 08:: (43) 28% (1591
E. coIl 36% (204) 22% 125) 09:: (51) 30% (167)
Salmonella 31% 176 21% (119) 090: (53) 35% 197)
Somewhat SomewhatBio Agent Agree DisagreeAgree Disagree
Anthrax 05% 1321 10% 230i 15% 429) 64’: 1785i
Brucellosis 03% (70) 06% (154( 13% 368) 73% (20331
Plague 06% (157) 12% 342i 16% 1499) 5O (1629)
Small pox 15% 416 21° 585 17% 483 43. 1189)
Tularemia 02% (55) 05% (130) 11% (318) 75% (2080)
Hemorrhagic
%, 266 . 4161 18% 509 52% (1452)fever
Influenza 49% (1352) 26% 1726) 08% (231) 15% (414)
E. cot 36% 9901 31% 18731 12% 334) 19% (525)
Salmonella 27% 1754) 28% 769( 14%. (386) 28°c 782)
Table 4.
— Nurses Rngyjecg,able about Biological Agents*
. Somewhat SomewhatBio Agent Agree DisagreeAgree Disagree
Anthrax 09% (238’ 18% 498) 17% 78) 52% 1443)
Brucellosis 04% (98) 09% (257) 14% (399) 68% (1881)
Plague 10% 276) 18% 512 19% 518) 48% 1337
S mall pox 19% (520) 24% (667) 17% (4821 37% (1014)
Tularemia 03% 78) 06% (1791 12% 3351 72% 2004)
Hernorrhaqic
‘-°“
‘ .D 4 1fever
Influenza 51% (1407) 27% (747) 07% (206) 13% (369)
B cot 43% 119% 711% 854 257 19% 4171
Salmoneta 32% (875) 29% (817) 12% (3421 24% (6.66)
Percentages of no responses for each of the nine 0:oiogcai agents cere
as fol,ov s antnrax 4 (118) brucelosis 5° (1401 plague 5 (132
small pox 3% 92): tularern)a, 6% (1791: influenza. 2% (46): E. ccli 2%
(52): salmonella. 3% 75)’. hemorrhagic fever. 4% i123.
Somewhat SomewhatBio Agent Agree DisagreeAgree Disagree
Anthrax 04% 1071 07% (203) 12% 332i 72% (1998)
Brucellosis 02% (46) 05% (129) 12% (320) 77% (2133)
Plague 04% 107 09% 24% 15% (409) 68% 1876
Small pox 09% (262) 14% (395) 15% (407) 58% (1597)
Tularemia 02% 51 04% (113) 10% (282) 78% 21711
Hemorrhaaic
.
-
.‘
-
-I b’- t 14fever
Influenza 38% (1045) 26% (708) 10% (267) 25% (694)
E. ccii 27% ;91 28% 774’ 12% %.42 30% 827’
SaImonel(a 20% (56% 24% :563 14% (378) 39% (10771
Table 3. — Physicians ability to treat casualties of a Biological
I ncidenr
Table 5. — Nurses ability to recognize signs and symptoms of
exposure to Biological Agents°
*percentages of no responses for each of the nine biological agents were
as follows: anthrax.3°0 (16(: brucellosis. 3°c (19): plague. 3% (17): small
pOX. 3°: (161: tularemia. 4°: (221: influenza, 3% (14): B. ccli. 2° (121:
salmonella 3° (14): hemorrhagic fever. 4% 120).
*Percentages of no responses for each of the nine biological agents were
as follows: anthrax, 5% (139): brucellosis. 5% (150): plague. 5% (148);
small pox. 4%. 1102): tularemia. 7%. 1192): influenza, 2° (52); B. ccli. 2%
(53): salmonella, 3% (841: hemorrhagic fever. 5° (1301.
Table 6. — Nurses ability to ticasualties of a Biological
lncident*
Percentages of no responses for each of the nine blo%gical agents were
as follows: anthrax 5% (137): brucellosis 5% (147): plague 5% (142);
small cox $ (114) tulrem a 6° ‘158) ) lfluPnza 2 ‘61 B cot 3
(731: salmonella. 4% (9%: hemorrhagic fever. 5% i128).
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Knowledge and Ability Concerning Chemical Agents
Iisica,zsandChe,alAae,its
In respoise to the statement concerning knott/ed ct of four catego
ries of chemical cents. i.e.. “I am knowledgeable about....” the
chemical agent group physicians reported knowing the most about
was Nerve Agents, receiving onlr 7(4 of the “agree” or “knowl
edgeable.” responses. The chemical aent ph\ sicians reported
knos.nig the least about was (hoLing Agents. reccis mg 65 or the
“hsacree’ or “not knowledgeable.” responses. Pha sicians’ re
sponses to the four chemical acent groups are presented in 1 able ‘7.
In response to the statement et neerning the oh/I/tv to root tunl:c
the signs and svnlptoms of four chemical agent groups. i.e.. “1 can
recognize the signs and symptoms of exposure to the chemical
agent go mp physicians reported being able tt most recoil ni/c 55 as
Ners e Agents, receiving t% of the “agree.” or “able to recognize”
responses. The chemical agent group physicians reported being able
to recognize the least ss as Blood Agents. receis ing (2(4 of the
“disagree” or “not able to recognize.” responses. Phx sicians’
responses to the four chemical agent groups are presented in Table
In response to the statement concerning the ability to Ireor four
chemical agent groups. i.e.. ‘1 know how to treat casLialtics of a
chemical incident involving physicians reporied Nerve Agents
as the group they s crc most able to treat. i.e.. 6(4 of the “agree:’ or
“able to treat” responses. The chemical agent groups ph\ siciaiis
reported least able to treat were Choking Agents tnd Blood Agents.
both gettinc 6k(4 of the “disagrei. or “not able to treat.” responses.
Phr sicians’ responses to the four c henncal agent groups aLe pre
sented in Table 9.
,Varses and Chemical .4giXs
In response to the statement concerning Anon/edge of tour catego
ries of chemical agents. i.e.. am knowledgeable about the
chemical agent group nurses repoited know ing the most about Was
Blood Agents. receis ing I (Y ‘ of the “agree.” or “know ledgeable”
responses. The chemical agent gi.oup nurses reported knowing the
least about were Choking and Blistering Agents, each receiving
r of the “disagree” or “not knowledgeable,” responses. Nurses
responses to the four chemical agent groups are presented in Table
I 0.
In response to the statement ci tucern inc the ability o rnt ogni
the signs and vnipioiii\ of four chemical agent groups. i.e.. 1 can
recognize the signs and symptoms of exposure to the chemical
agent groups nurses reported being able to most recognite were
C[ioking and Blood agents. i.e.. each receiving 1%’ of the “agree,” or
“able to recognize” responses. The chemical agent group nurses
reported being able to recognize the least was Nerve agents. ccciv
inc (s.-I% of the “disagi’ee” or “not able to i’ccognize,” responses.
Nurses’ i espoitses to the four chemical agent groups are presented
in Table if.
lit response to the statement concernin the oh//hr 10 rr It four
chemical agent eroups. i.e.. 1 know how to treat casualties of a
chemical incident involving.... “ the chemical agent group nurses
reported most able to treat wts Choking Agents, receiving 7% of the
“agree.’’ or “able to treat’’ responses. The ehenneal agent group
nurses i’cportcd least able to treat was Nerve .\gcnts.reeeis mug 71
of the “disagree” or “not able to treat,” responses. Nurses’ responses
to the four chemical agent croups ire presented in Table 12.
Chemical Somewhat SomewhatAgree . Disagree
Agent Agree Disagree
Nerve
..
, 1%’- ., ;. .s2:
Agents
Choking 5% (271 10% (58) 18% (991 65% (366)
Agents
B!oo
‘‘ 0 t29i 11 83) id 183 63 351
Agents
Bi)sterng ..
..
14’-
A.gents - - - -
Table 8. — Physicians ability to recog,dze the signs and symptoms
of exposure to chemical Agent Groups’
Chemical Somewhat SomewhatAgree Disagree
Agent Agree Disagree
Nerve 8% (4.3) 18% 199) 16% )87 57% (318)
Agents
Choking 6% (34j 12% 691 19% (105) 61% /341)
Agents
Blood 4% 241 13% 711 19% 1104 62’ 1348
Agents
Bhstering 6’ 3% 16’, 189) 17% (94: 60’s (333:
Agents
‘Percentages of no responses for each of the four chemical agent groups
were as follows: nerve agents. 2% 112): choking agents. 2% (10): blood
agents. 2% (121: blistering agents. 2% liii.
Table 9. — Physicians ability to tr casualties of Chemical Agent
Groups’
Chemical A re
Somewhat Somewhat Disaoree
Acent Agree D:sagree
Nerve 6°1 (311 12% )66 15% (83) 65% (364)
Agents
Cnoen.c
;--. 83.
Agents
Blood .. .. .,
. 15’) Si.1 83%
Blistering (201 10% /56) 1615 (92) 67% (376)
Agents
‘Percentaces 1 to despcoses Ot each o the one-owe: agent groucs
were as follows: nerve agents. 3% (15); choking agents, 2% (13); blood
agents. 3% (15): b)(ster)ng agents, 3% 115).
Table 7. — Physicians iiQw .d,geabl. about Chemical Agent
Groups’
‘Percentages of no responses for each of the four chemical agent groups
ore as folion s ner e agen s 2 ii chos ng ave83n 2 i 9 blooo
agents. 2% ii): blistering agents. 2’) (11
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Chemical Somewhat SomewhatAgree DisaoreeAgent Agree D,sagree
Nerve
05% (1411 13% (3521 14% %82) 65% 1816)Agents
Chokno
- -
-
o 1 r) & d3Agents
Blood
Agents U_
Blistering
06% (161) 12% (337) 13% (369) 66% (1838)Agents
Chemical Sow ewhat SomewhatAgree DisagreeAgent Agree Dsagree
Nerve 5% (142 13% (355) 15% (4141 64% (1783)Agents
Choking 8% 223) 13% 360 1% (384 62% 17341Agents
Blood 8% )220i 14% (379) 14% ‘380) 62% 1725iAgents
Blistering
7% (196 12% (345) 15% 411) 63% 1748)Agents
Table 12.
— Nurses ability to treat casualties of Chemical Agent
Groups’
Chemical Somewhat SomewhatAgree DisaareeAgent Agree D:sagree
Nerve (99) 08% (222) 14% (378) 71% (1967)Agents
Cowng
—
Agents
-
B1ood
71 (2’ 08 “4j o6 c(4e
Bl;sterrc
-.
—
..
-.
. 08Agents
‘Percentages of no resoonses for each of the four chemical agent croeps
oere as follows: nerve agents. 4% 109,. chc:ng agents. 4% liOCi, blood
agents. 3% (100. blistering agents, 4% (1051.
Interest in Training/Education
Respondents were asked to report whether or not they were inter
ested in reccis mg more trannig/educattoii concerning biological
and chemical gent’. A higher pcrcentae 01 the nurses were
interested in more training and education than were the doctors for
both hiolosrical. i.e.. doctors 73%” nurses 85% , and chemical agents,
i.e.. doctors % nurses X4%
. In addition. 75% ul the physicians
and 7-P ol the nurses preirt’cd receivine (fE credits lIar education
and training.
Commitment to help Staff Non—Hospital. Field Medical Facili
ties
Respondents were asked Instate whetlieror not the\ would help staff
a Odd medical facility under the conditions of different types of
incidents_i.e.. Biolocical. Chcnncal. Explosion. Radiological. Con
tagious Epidemic. and Natural Disaster. The results of this study
showed that during a Natural Disaster a large majority of the
respondents. 83% of doctors and 90% of nurses, would help staff
non—hospital. field medical facilities. I-low es er. l’ar fewer respon
dents. 57% ol doctors and 45% of nurses. s aid ther would help staff
these same facilities if a Radiological incident caused mass casual
ties. The responses of physicians and nurses who stated they “would
help stall” are show it in Table 1 3. Note that both groups differen
tiated between the lv pes ot’events in terms ol their availability in the
same order, i.e. from most available to least availahle.
Table 13.
— Commitment to help staff non-hospital, field medical
facilities by Incident and Profession’
Physician’ Nurse’
Natural Disaster 83% 4611 90% 2499)
Explosion Incident 67% (372) 70% (1941)
Chemical Incident 59% 329) 59% 16441
BIological Incident 56% (315) 53% (1474)
Contagious Epidemic 56% (3121 49% 1352)
Radiological Incident 52% (290) 45% (1254)
‘ number of phvsc,ars. n, = 559 and nurses. n = 2775 responding
C tmitment to Nd St on-Ho ital Field Medical Fadili
tjet in Relatjo, ,JThth,gjcal and Chemical Scores
.—\ comparison was made to determine ii there was a relationship
between the level of know ledge and ahili% of the physicians and
nurses, as retlected in their hiolocical and chemical scores. and their
commitment to help stall non—hospital. field medical facilities. In
this analysis items such as Explosion Incident. Radiological Inci
dent. and Natural Disaster were eltminated, as responses to these
types of events would have no evident relationship to knowledge
and ability concerning biological and chemical agents. The biologi
cal quartiles atid the chemical tertiles deser bed earlier were Lised in
this analysis,
Table 10, — Nurses knowIegble about Chemical Agent Groups’
Percentages of no responses for each of the four chemical agent groups
were as follows nerve agents. 3% (84): choKing agents. 3% 76): blood
agents, 2% (67): blistering agents, 3% (70).
Table 11.
— Nurses ability to tconI the signs and symptoms of
exposure to Chemical Agent Groups’
‘Percentages of no responses for each of the four chemical agent groups
were as follows: nerve agents. 3% l81 i: choking agents. 3% 1741: blood
agents, 3% 1711: blistering agents, 3% 75).
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Ph sician Pt /oç’uti/ Scores, the sum of reported knowledge and
ability related to biological agents. and responses to whether or not
thes would help staff non—hospital, field medical facilities in the
event of a Biolouu’a/ Into/cot were compared. Results ot this
analysis are listed in Table 14 and indicate that the more know ledge
and ability physicians reported. the more willing they were to help
stall’ non—hospital. held medical facilities during a biological mci—
dent. For example. 73,7% of doctors categorited as “most know I
educable and able” stated they would help. Whereas, only 35,4% of
those in the “least know ledgeable and able’’ qu’trtilc committed io
help.
Physician responses to staff field medical facilities during a
C’oiiiaseiou.s Epidcnfa were compared to their Bio/ot’u’a/ Scores.
Results of this analysis are listed in Table 15 and indicate that the
more knowledge and ability physicians reported. the more they
stated they would help stall ni in—h spita I held medical facilities
during acontagious epidemic. Furexample. whereas 753( percent
of physicians who reported having the most knowledge and ability
in reference to biological agents said ther would help staff field
hospital facilities during a contagious epidemic. onlr 33,3( nfthosc
in the least knowledge and ability quartile committed to do so.
Physician responses to staff field medical facilities during a
Cheniusi/ luculent were compared to Clicunicui/ S ‘oct’s. Results of
this analysis are listed in Table 16 and indicate that the more
knowledgeable and able physicians reported being with a chemical
agents the more they stated they would help staflnon—hospital. held
medical facilities. For example. 7S.4 percent of those who
reported being most knowledgeable and’hle in refei’ence to chemi
cal agents committed to help during a chemical incident. in contrast
to only 41 ,7( of those in the least knowledgeable and able tertile.
,Vui’st’
Nurse Bwlou4icc I Scores, the sum ot reported knowledge and ability
related to biological agents. and responses to whether or not they
would help staff non—hospital. held medical facilities in the event of
a Biolouieal hun/en’ w here compared. Results of this analysis are
listed in Table 17 and indicate that the more knowledge and ability
ntirses reported. the more they stated the ss ould help staff non—
hospital. held medical faci Ii ties during a biological inc i dent For
example, whereas 66.2% percent of nurses who reported having the
most knowledge and ability in reference to biological agents said
the\ would help stall field hospital facilities during a biological
incident. only 41 .ff% in the third quartile and 42,6% of those in the
least knowledge and abilitr fourth quartile committed to do so.
Nurse responses to w hether or not they would stall field medical
facilities during a Contagious Epidemic were also compared to
Thologic Scores, Results of this analysis are listed in Table I X and
indicate that the more know ledecable and able nurses reported in
reference to a contagious epidemic the more they stated they \s ould
help staff non—hospital. field medical facilities, F)r example.
whereac 60.2’ percent sf ii urses m’ep u’ti nn the most know ledge and
abilit in reference to biological agents said they s ould help staff
field hospital facilities during a contagious epidemic. only’ 35. I % of
those in the least know ledge and ahilit\ quartile cummitied to do so.
Nurse responses to ‘taft’field medical facilities during a (‘hem/cal
Incident were compared to their Chemnical Scores. Results of this
Table 14. — Physician staffing commitment during a Biological
Incident compared to Biological Score
Number in Percentage of
Biological Score Physicians n
.
Quartile Would Quartile WouldQuartile Quartile Help Staff Help
1st Quartile 154 115 71.7’.
2nd Quartile 181 116 64.1%
3rd Quartile 125 49 392%
4th Quartile 99 35 35 4%
‘1st Quartile includes most knowledgeable and able, 4th quartile includes
not knowledgeable and able.
Biological Score Physicians in
Number in Percentage of
Quartile’ Quartile Quartile W
ould Quartile Would
Help Staff Help
1st Quartile 154 116 75.3%
2nd Quartile 181 110 60.8%
3rd Quartile 125 53 42.4%
4th Quartile 99 33 33.3%
Number of Number in Percentage of
Chemtcal Score . ,
, Physicians in Tertile Would Tertile WouldTertile Tertne Heip Staff Help
1st Tertile 125 98 78.4%
2no Tertiie 1% 113
3rd Tertile 283 18
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Table 15. — Physician staffing commitment during a Confagious
Epidemic compared to Biologic Score’
*1st Quartile includes most knowledgeable and able, 4th quartile includes
not knowledgeable and able,
Table 16. — Physician staffing commitment during a Chemical
Incident compared to Chemical Score*
‘1st Tertile includes most knowledgeable and able. 3rd fertile includes not
knowledgeable and able.
Number in Percentage ofBiological Score Number Nurses Quartiie Would Quartile WouldQuartile’ in Quartile Help Staff Help
1st Quartile 835 553 662%
2nd Quart;le 865 469 512%
3rd Quartile 786 329 11.9%
4th Quartile 289 123 42.6%
Table 18. — Nurse staffing commitment during a Contagious
Epidemic compared to Biologic Score*
. Number in Percentage ofBiological Score Nurses 0’
. Quarfie Would Quartile WoulaQuartile’ Quartile Help Staff Help
1st Quartile 835 503 60.2%
2nd Quartile 865 432 49.9%
3rd Quartile 786 307 39.1%
4th Quartile 289 110 38.1%
‘1st Quartile includes most knowledgeable and able, 4th quartile includes
not knowledgeable and able.
Number n Percentage ofChemical Score
. Nurses in Tertile Tertile Would Tertile WouldTertle’
Help Staff Help
is! Tertile 715 53 71,7%
2nd Tert.ile 592 351
.3rd Tertle 1428 759 52.8%
anal\ sis are listed in Table ]14 and indicate that the nmre kiio ledge
and abilit nurses reported. the more they stated ihey won Id he] p
staff non—hospital, field medical facilities during a chemical inci
dent. For e\ample. whereas 7] .7% percent ot nurses who reported
has ian the most knowledge and abi litv in reference to chemical
auents said the’ would help staff tield hospital facilities during a
chemical incidetlt, only 52.S’f of those in the least knowledge and
ability tertile committed to do so.
Commitment to Help Staff Non-Hospital. Field Medical Facili
ties in Relation to Phsicians’ Practice
A further analysis was performed h comparing the data concerning
“commitment to help stafP’ to the information respondents provided
about their practice or specialty. This was done io determine if’
practice orspecmaltv made a di Iference in xs hetheror not they “would
help stat I non—hospital. t’ield medical facilities. Due to the low
number of i’cspondents representing certain specialties (e.g.. infec
tious disease. pulmonary, etc.), only two categories of doctors were
compared. Primary Care physicians comprising 42’ (234 of the
doctor group were compared to a group labeled ‘‘Other,’’ which
represented 4o.2’ 122—I) of the doctors, The “Other” group included
physicians who detined their practice as infectious disease, pulmo
nary medicine, multiple specialty, and retired with an active license
($.2( 1. or Other (32’if. More of the Primary Care group consis—
tenth reported the ss ould help staff held medical facilities than the
“Other” croup as shown in Table 2)). For example. the greatest
differences beiween the two groups were illustrated in their re
sponses to helping staff facilities during a Contagious Epidemic,
68cf to 5O%. and a Biological Incident. 66’ to 5 I Primary Care
to “Othei” respectir clv.
As )7(’) of the nurses reported R ci’edentials no analysis was
conducted to compare this group to the much smaller nurse groups.
Table 20. — Physician commitment to help staff non-hospital. field
medical facilities by Incident and Type of Practice’
Primary Care’ Qther’
Biological Incident 66% (155) 51% 115)
Chemical Incident 67% 057’; 54% 122;
Explosion Incident 69% (161) 62% )138)
Radi%og;c.al lncioen.1 58% .126 ‘8% ‘108;
Contagious Ep;demic 56% 58 50% 12)
Natural Disaster 84% 095) 81% 081)
‘Prmare Care. 234: Qther. n = 224
Discussion
Staffing Standards, Healthcare Professionals Commitment, and
Patient Care Capacity
‘l’he purpose of this study w as 10 assess Honolulu’” hcalihcai’c
pi ok ssion d p iLitS to slit] non hospir it I iLId m do.. d I iLl litis
Table 17. — Nurse staffing commitment during a Biologic Incident
compared to Biologic Score’
‘1st Quartile includes most knowledgeable and able. 4th quartile includes
not knowledgeable and able.
Table 19. — Nurse staffing commitment during a Chemical Incident
compared to Chemical Score’
‘1st Tert)ie ncades most knowledeable and able. 3rd terhe ncludes not
snovleageable and able.
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established to provide medical care to mass casualties caused by a
WNII) incident or natural disaster, and to determnie the lesel of
\\N1 D related knowledge and espertise among these doctors and
nurses. The Honolulu Metropolitan Medical Response Ss stem
(MMRS) Committee sought this information so that emergency
planners could calculate the number of patients for whom Honolulu
would be able to provide emergenc medical care before ii would
need assistance from Federal sources. In addition. local planners
could determine training and education req in rements to pare for
a \\ Nil) tncideni and des elop niaterials concerning standing orders
and protocols to he used under mass casualty conditions.
To compute the number of doctors and nurses needed to provide
care for l0 of Honolulu’s population. ic,. 101)000 patients. a
MNIRS subcommittee utilized the L.S. .\rm Soldier and Biologi
cal Chemical Command S13CCO’l studies which included staff
requirements for non—hospital. held medical facilities. S BCCON I
created the Modular Emergency Medical System (MEM S) as an
organizational strategy forthe care of mass casualties resulting from
biological terrorism incidents. For the purpos of this stud\
stafhng iieeds during mass casualty situations were extrapolated
troni the S BC CON I standards for two nialor I unctions. i.e.. the
pii,iinrv ponil of entry into the emergency medical system and
inpaTient treatment. For example. S BCCOM developed the concept
of Neighborhood Emergency Help Centers to provide a primary
point of entr into the emergenc\ medical s stem for patients and
worried well, in order to distribute proph lactic medications. quickl
sort through people seeking care, and ensure that those ss ho need are
stabilized forevacuation to adeimnitive care facility. To accomplish
these tasks, SBCCOM suggests the need foraconibined staff of 80.
including 6 ph sicians and 18 nurses to cover tis o 12—hour shifts in
order to process and treat 1 .00(1 people a da
Another SBCCOM emergency medical structure is the Acute
Care Center ACC), which ssas designed. organized. equipped. and
staffed specifically to treat patients who need inpatient treatment hut
do not require mechanical ventilation and those who are likely to die
from illness or inurics. Patients who require ads aneed life support.
such as pros ided by intensive or critical care units, would receive
priori tv for hospital ad ni ssion rather than adm i ii in to the ACC, It
local hospitals ss crc alread he ond capacity. the patients would
receive as much care as the ACC is capable of pro iding. SI3CCOM
defines the inpatient treatment of the ACC as providing only
antibiotics. h\ dration. bronchodilatnrs. and pain management. 3(1
pros ide inpatient ti-eatment to casualties, in general. S BCCON1
reconnuends Acute Care Centers he ph sieally set up into 50-hed
pods. each composed of live 50-bed nursing units. The suggested
minimum staffing for doctors and nurses, per 12—hour shift for a 50—
bed. itursing subunit providing patient care is eight. i.e., one phvsi
Jan and se en nurses,- Consequentl\. staffing an ACC requires 40
doctors and 7Xi) nurses to pros ide care for 1.01mm) patients per da\
during two I 7-hour shifts
HthcareIs,cio,,StaT’I,mcidentand
Ptiitcaacity
\ hen estimating the number of healthcare pi’okssiomials as ailable
to provide enierency medical care this study found that it is
important toe onsider the tpe of capon of mass destruction used.
Is p rucipanis dm1 fcrcnt iafd h tss cvn thL is pes ot cnts t ii ss hich
they svould he available to provide care (Table 13). For example, the
least nu i nher m if both d ctors and ii urses reported the would
respond to a Radiological Incident .52 and 45( respectively.
while the most would assist during a Natural Disaster. S3 and 9(Y-
respectively. In fact, both doctors and nurses discriminated between
the six different types of incidents in relation to their commitment to
help in exactly the same manner. i.e.. from most to least. Natural
Disaster. Explosion. Chemical. Biological. Contagious, and Radio—
locical i Table I 3e These findings suggest that emergenc planners
can not assume that because niedmeal personnel will volunteer to
assist in one t\ pe of incidetit, e.g.. natural disaster or con\ entional
explosion, that they will do so under conditions involving other
weapons of mass destruction, such as biological or radiological.
Further studies should identify amid explore factors that determine or
affect the coni ni tment of heal t heare profess ioiial s to staff non—
hospital. field medical facilities during a niass casualty incident, and
how the these factors can he enhanced or mediated, depending on the
type of affect on commitment. i.e., negative or positive.
Applvin the SBCCOM standard for staffing needs per day
described above to the nunther of doctors ss ho stated they would
help staff field medical facilities during a Biological Incident 56’4
n = 3)5), these physicians could provide emergeimcy iriedical care
such as triage, treatment, prophvlaxis. and education at primary
point ofenmtr facilities to 52,50f( victims, or care for approximately
7.Otft) patients at the inpatient treatment level. In addition. the nurses
panticipatinL’ in this study who stated they would help staff field
facilities during a Biological Incident ( 53( . n = I .474 i ss ould he
able to provide pnimar\ point of entry care to appi’oximatelv 82.OOt)
victims, or inpatient treatment [or 5.264 patients. To estimate a
practical capacity for providing emergency care in Honolulu. the
peicentages of doctors arid nurses stating they would help staff fmelul
medical facilities for different types of agents were applied, even
though the methodology used in this study does not piovide a
statistically represemitative saniple of the doctoi-s and nurses in
Hawaii. Thus, to project availability of healthcare professionals
during a biological incmdent, the factor .56 Table 1 3 was applied to
the 2.235 total doctors in the state. resulting in I .252 doctors svho
might assist in f’ield medical facilities. [tilizing the staffing stan
dards described earlier, estimations shoss this numniber of doctors
could treat approximately 2(19,000 (21% of Honolulu’s populatiomn
victims with primary point of entry care, or 31.300 patients (3% of
Honolulu’s population i at the inpatient treatment level during a
biological incident. .\pplain similar logic, it’ 53’ I Table 13 ( or
6.5h I of Hass an’s 12.38(1 nurses s em-c ss illine to assist in treaiine
patients exposed to biologic agents. 1-lomiolulum is ould he able to
provide 363,522 victims (36% of Honolulu’s population) with
primary point of entry level care or approxirnatel 23,400 patients
2.3 3 Homiolulu’s population ss ith inpatient treatment. Ac the
P3ec’tions of staffing and patient capacity impl . Homiolmmlu. and
any other city for that matter. has a better opportunit\ ot meetine the
requmirements of emergency medical care or its population duritig a
WMI)-related mass casualty incident if it can provide most or all of
that care through primar\ poimit sf entry level fuitictions rather than
at the inpatient tm’eainient les el. Relman states. “Intervemitioii dunimig
this early preel inical imicimhatiomi phase provides the greatest oppor
tumiitx for hem’ lit. “ Thus, the ahos e capacit estimations hihlight
the need for not only improvement of the traditional public health
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surveillance ss stem that tracks s mploms. syndromes and health
indicators, hut also implementation olprecautionars environmental
sun ci Ilance and detection systems that allo monitoring of the
environment even when there is no direct or knoss it threat so that a
biological agent release can be detected and identi lied helore
svnlptonls occur in the population. As suggested h\ t[ie calculations
ahose, the risks ate ercat and a community imis increase the
etTtciencs ol its medical and public health stalling resources lit can
he in a position to only need to provide proph lactic care for its
citizens rather than therapeutic treatment.
Accordinelv, soon after September 11 . 20() I Honolulu estab
lished an environmental surveillance and detection system, the
Biological Weapons Illness Prevention Program. or BioWIPP. to
monitor water and air for release of biological agents. As a result.
air samples ha e been taken routinel\ and analyzed al maior nation
alL or niteritationalir recognited events, such as the NFL Pro Bowl,
concerts given h\ well kno n celebrittes such as Janet Jackson. and
nationally televised local sports e ents. e.g.. those involving the
Lniversit\ ol Flasvaii. as wcll as ot[ier high \tsihilit\ e\ enis involv
ing mass—gatherings in the cit . In addition, as part ol this procram.
HonolLilu regularlx samples its \\ aterand tests s ith PCR technology
for biological agents. and has de\ eloped a 24—hour a day air
sampling sx stem also using PCR technology for agent detection and
identification. The goal of Hoitolulu’s environmental sLirveillance
program is to augment the public health system’s clinical surveil
lance network so that a biological agent can be detected within 24—
hours of its release. Such a system allows the public health sector
to definiik clv determine the presence of a biological weapon and
affords the possibility to provide prophylactic treatment to those
exposed and infected before thex become symptomatic and need
inpatient treatment or critical care. II’ this type ol’ precautionary
environmental surveillance and detection system is successful,
Honolulu ss ould have enough healthcare professionals. as projected
above. Ii cire for more than the mm ninu.im standard of 1 (P7 of the
popu lai m in a biological incident at its pi-i niarx point of entt-v
facilities.
Knowledge, Ability, and Commitment to Help Stall’ on-Hospi
tal Field Medical Facilities
In addition to estimating staffing resources available during a
response to a WMD incident, this study sought to assess whether
doctors and nurses possessed the knowledge and ability to treat
victims of a \\ M[) incident. Iarticipants’ responses concerning
their \V\I 1)—related knoss ledge and abilities suggest a suhstantmal
need br training and education to improve Honolulu’s prepared
ness. For instance. 7 I of the nnnes reported not km m nig how to
treat Ners e Agents, while 951 ot the physicians reported the same
Table9 . In theeontextofinternational terrorism thcse resultsseem
problematic. a Aiim Shinriko. a Japanese dm msdax cult, headed
by Shoko Asahara. used the ners c agent sarin in the Tokx o subway
system atiack on March 20, 1 P)5, This act resulted in 12 people
being killed and over 1,0(X) sickened (17 critical pal tents. 37 severe,
and 984 moderate). Reports front hospitals attending to patients that
day stated that man nurses and doctors unknowingly were provid
ing care for contaminated patients. and consequentlx became sick
from secondary exposure to sarin .ALer the event the Japanese
medical community declared that due to lack of’ knm ledge and
ahilitx concerning sarin it vs as woefully unprepared for such an
incident. From this experience the medical commLulitx world—vs ide
learned that being unprepared can not onlx alfeet the quality of care
gis en to victims of a terrorist act. hut also can affect the ahilit of
healthcare providers to go e care if they theinsels es become con—
maininated or sick. ‘ Although this information was available, based
on the responses in this study, most participants did not acquire the
knovs ledge and abilitx needed to respond to a terrorist incident
tuvols ing the use of ners e agents such as sarmn. In fact, while
vsorking with the public health and medical community through the
planning arid development of the Honolulu’s Metropolitan Medical
Response System. many in the healthcare professions voiced the
opinion that a WMD event was not likely to occur in America, or, at
least. not in Honolulu. The events on September Il, 2001 and the
subsequent use of anithrax in the following months may have
dispelled many illusiomn, Although, it remains to he seen through
future studx to what degree he altheare professionals will obtain and
retain knoss ledge and skills in the area of ViM D. it would be
mstrueti\ e for all those responsible for pros idimmg education and
training to these professionals to determine Lie tors specific to the
medical and public health comnmunit\ that support or prevent
acquisition of the new knosv ledge and skills needed.
Acquiring WMD-related knowledge and skills depends both on
individual interest to do so and on environmental (or systemic)
conditions acting as either sLipportive or preventive forces in relation
to attaining knowledge and ability.5 For instance, an overwhelming
majority of participants in this study reported an interest in obtaining
more training/education concerning biological or chemical agents.
For the doctors, 73(4 wanted more biological and 727 wanted more
chemical training/education, while for the nurses. 55(7 anted more
biological, and S4s vs anted more chemical training/education. Ii
healthcare prolessionals are intem-ested in more education and tm-am—
rig. providers ofCE and administrators of hospital institutions need
to determimie how they can best support and strengthemm tIns intet’est
while pros idin opportunities for learning. In addition. further
studx should determine barriers to obtaining Vi MD—related training
and how best to remove these harriers, so that doctors and nurses can
both develop and more easily pursue their interest to learn about this
area. An American College of Physicians ACEP) report on
objectives, content, and competencies for training of emergency
healthcare professionals suggests that funding and time are primary
harriers to developing and implementing WM D response training.’
I—or example. the report lists failum’e of hospital administrators to
recog ui/c Vi N ID related trai um rig a. a n p priori tx , inadequate
Li uding to cover attendance of education and tram nine progranis
leg,. time off’, tuition. and travel t. and personnel shortages that
make it impossible to coy er positions while people are heuig tratned
a barr mer to both enlergencx physic ian and nurse attendance of
‘A NI I) related prooramns. Recent federal funding for hospital
preparedness and training h r healthcare pwfessionals may help to
reutos e these barriers and asSist ri the inci’ease of knowledge and
ahiliix in the area of treatment of WMD casualties. Future studies
should he conducted to determine the affect of these funding efforts
on readiness of both healfhcare professionals and institutions to
respond appropriately to WMI) incidents.
The bindings in this studx highlight the importance of having a
ku ov ledgeable and able medical and public health vs orkforce to a
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cOnhintiflhtvs ahilit to pros ide care during a mass casualt incident.
This study found that the more kno\\ ledge and ability respondents
reported. the more willing they were to help staff non—hospital, field
medical facilities during an incident involving a biological. conta
gious or chemical agent. respeetivel\ Tables 14 to lOt. This result
suggesis that pres ions kiioss ledge and ahilii in \V\ID may he a
tactor related to obtaining commitment to help staff non—hospital.
field medical facilities. It ss ould scent that those who knoss and can
do, in most cases, will do. This finding accentuates the importance
of supporting WMD—related learning as an investment in the overall
capacity of a eon’imunitv’ s medical and public health s stem, as it
suggests that education and training toda\ . ill result in staff
willingness to provide care during a mass casualt incident tomor
row. C’onsequentlv. medical and public health communit\ leaders
should s iew CE as part of a system-based development process (i.e..
a learning activity responsive to systemic or organizational needs
that can promote growth and development) as well as an individual—
based development process (i.e.. a series of learning activities
responsive to the educational interests and needs of individual
physicians that can lead to providing improved cardf.’ Medical and
public health agencies will be overrun if the magnitLide of mass
casualties projected for biological, chemical or radiological agent
release occur. If the personnel providing care in a community are not
adequately trained there easily can he a recurrence of what happened
in Tokyo, as mentioned above, In contrast, in a mass casualty
situation. healthcare professionals that are adequately trained will
he both safe and able to provide quality care to the community the
normall\ sers e. and ssill have to continue to serve after the medical
crisis. In this light, barriers to continuing education, whether
individual-, organizational-, or systemic-based, are harriers to con
tinuing medical effectiveness and must he addressed throughout the
medical and public health community.
Furthermore, according to phsician responses in this study, type
of practice. i.e.. Primary Care, was related to commitment to help
staft’ non—hospital. field medical facilities Tablc 20). This result
suggests type of practice is a factor that should be considered when
planning education and training programs. If Primary Care physi
cians are more likely to help staff emergency medical facilities
under conditions of all t p of’ mass casualty es ems, then it ss mild
seem prudent that continuing medical education planners t’ind ways
to incli.ide these community healthcare professionals in training and
education programs. Especially, emergency planners should inte
grate Primary Care physicians in field exercises in order to better
prepare them to function under emergency medical conditions and
increase their knowledge and skills b svorking alongside emer
genc\ physic ians and nurses, as well as to afford them the opportu—
nit to apply mass casualt niedical protocols Such efforts, accord
ing to the findings ni this studs . might be the most eftjcient use of
resources. and. in addition to emergency physicians, a perfect place
to begin training in the medical community at large.
Di//’re,,eec between Know! intL1 bility
Anal sis of participant responses underscored the difference be
tween knownig and doing. 1—or drnost every biological and chemi
cal \VM1) acent. both doctors and nurses responded with a similar
pattern. i.e., as the questions moved from knoss ledge to recognition
to treatment for each agent. the responses moved in the direction of
t’eweri’e spondents reporting the ability to recognize and treat (Tables
I to 12). For example. using responses to Plague as a model, 48f)-
of the physicians reported not being knowledgeable, 52cf reported
not being able to recognize signs and symptoms of exposui’e, and
61 ff reported not knowing how to treat casualties of a Plague
Incident. ‘I’hese results suggest that CM E programs must not only
focus on the kmns ledge les el but must also pros ide aetis ities that
ss ill alloss healthcai’e professionals to gain practical experience in
recognizing and treating these agents. The ,ACEP report recognizes
these different levels of learning and establishes objectives for both
the awareness and performance levels of emergency physician and
nur”e training, For example. whereas an awareness obiectis e night
he to mjluin lioss ti’eatment in—place and use of alternati s e care
t’ac ilities micht he used, an objective on the performance level might
he to describe ond demon,orate initial assessnient. triage. and
stabilization for a biological event. Consequently, it is suggested
that CE programs must broaden goals to not only provide awareness
and knowledge les el activities hut also include training and educa
tion formats that pi’omote the use and demonstration of skills and
abilities and engage the higher level cognitive pi’ocesses. such as
analysis, evaluation, problem solving, and decision—making, that ai’e
the essential infrastructure of qualit medical care.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study’ was to determine the capacity of Honolulu
to provide emergency medical care to s ictims of an incident caused
by a WMD or natural disaster and to determine the level of expertise
of the healthcare professionals in the eommunit\ All doctors and
nurses licensed and living in Hawaii were asked to respond to an
assessment tool. The mail survey response was 25ff of physicians
and 22.4ff of the nurses. This study provides a pre-September I 1,
2001 baseline ot the commitment of a population ol’ physicians and
nurses to staff’ non—hospital. field medical facilities during a mass
casualt\ incident caused h ss eapons of mass destruction and of their
knowledge and skills in relation to treatment of the ictims of
biological and chemical agents. The findings suggest that if 1-lono-
lulu had to provide care for victims who had become symptomatic
and needed inpatient treatment or critical care due to a \VMD
release, it would f’all short of the standard established for Meti’opoli—
tan Medical Response System cities set by the Department of Health
and Human Services. i.e.. 1 tY of the population or 100.01(t) for
Honolulu. Consequentl. this study illustrates the importance of
precautionary environmental surveillance and detection programs
that would afford the medical and public health community the
opportunity to pros ide prophylactic care to victims exposed to
\V\ID. therch’s eliminating or greatl i’educine the need for inpatient
orer itmeal care treatment, In addition. results suggest that emcm’oency
planners can not assume that because healtheare professionals ss ill
volunteer to assist in one tape of incident. e.g.. natural disasters, that
they are will do so under conditions involving different weapons of
mass destruction, e,., rac,Iiological. contagious epidemic. biologi
cal and L’henlieal. Furthermore although the methodology used in
this studx does not provide a statisticall i’epm’escntatise sample of’
the doctors and nurses in lIas an, Honolulu and other communities
might use these findings io estimate their ahil it\ to provide emner
gency’ hcalthcare for mass casualty incidents involving different
WIVID, Moreover, this study illustrates the importance of education
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and training to a community’s ability to respond to a WMD release,
as the more knowledge and ability participants reported the more
they committed to staffing emergency field medical facilities.
Finally, it is suggested that emergency planners. leadership in the
medical communit and continuing medical education determine
the level of knowledge and ability for healthcare professionals
necessary to maintain readiness and preparedness in our society,
support existing interest in obtaining training and education, remove
barriers to utilizing CE offerings and opportunities, and then use
training and educational techniques and technologies to help doctors
and nurses acquire the knowledge and skills they need to he beth
prepared and committed to serve during a mass casualty incident
resulting from the use of WMD, Future studies should determine
whether there has been: I a change in commitment levels of
healthcare professionals in relation to their willingness to volunteer
during different types of WMD incidents: 2. an increase in knowl
edge and abilities related to WMI) agents: a sustained effort to
support and provide appropriate CE: 4. removal of individual,
organizational and systemic harriers to obtaining knowledge and
skills related to WMD-relevant CE: and 5. the use and evaluation of
surveillance and detection systems implemented so as to provide
pre-symptomatic awareness and protection.
Source of Funding
This study was conducted through a contract (No. 282-97-0049) with the Depart
ment of Health and Human Services. The study would not have been possible
without the cooperation of the Hawaii Medical Association, the Hawaii Nurses
Association, and the Hawaii State Department of Health. The main author extends
a special note of gratitude to Mayor Jeremy Harris for his continued support for this
and other projects in the pursuit of excellence in government and public service.
References
1 N gboorh od E cv p c r A Ma C 8y SIr I gy or Boogic ron I cd I
Pr pared re pan o fIr Nnn g Don’ mc on 8 Prep r a P ogr by lb D p rt
menlo D I I y 2 0 US Army od d BoIogn’ Ch mm Comma d “meand
Of a 0 m 5 8 BI ckh wk oad Ao d nO vng rou d MD21OIO 4 4
AucrCt AM CuIy0r ‘tavfoBoIon’ Tomle” Ppr
I N g Do m Do P p r n g by I p r of
n b 1 U A ala d B a’ co H d
I n Of 5 83 B k w Ro d Ab d Proj a Gro nd Mu 1 5 2
R 0 A a a S d a ‘e ton ‘8 d pro ‘a d o p o I B og
T r at d “on A I d r pa p by 00 op n Ed
v’ob 11 AA ‘P AId “Mon N’ A .y
w
S i
I
.
g “iCc A
9 J ‘IoN
.1< dAK’ A r
ba r
V 1
‘Il “ ,,,.I ‘-‘1
I I - ,. 1 .
i f I’
t”I I y
14
OAHU: 941-4411
NEIGHBOR ISLANDS TOLL-FREE:
1-800-362-3585
Free Hotline 24 Hours a Day.
POISON CENTER TIPS
• Keep the number of the Hawaii Poison Center on
or near your telephone.
• If you suspect a poisoning, do wait for signs
and symptoms to develop. Call the Hawaii Poison
Center immediately.
• Always keep Ipecac Syrup in your home. (This is
used to make a person vomit in certain types of
poisoning.) Do r use ipecac Syrup
unless advised by the Hawaii Poison
Center.
• Store all medicines, chemicals, and household
products out of reach and out of sight, preferably
locked up.
• A good rule to teach children is to “always ask
first” before eating or drinking anything—don’t
touch, don’t smell, don’t taste,
Donate to help us save lives.
Mail checks, payable to:
Hawaii Poison Center
1319 Punahou Street, Honolulu, HI 96826
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